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Risk and Market Participant Behavior
in the U.S. ·slaughter Cattl� Market
Incomplete and varying degrees of information on product quality creates risk
in a market transaction. Numerous researchers have documented that market
participants will react differently in the presence of risk depending upon their attitudes
toward risk. Many of these studies have classified agricultural market participants
according to the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient into three general categories of
risk averse, risk neutral, or risk preferring (Raskin and Cochran, Wilson and Eidman,
King and Robinson) and have found individuals in all three categories.
The U.S. slaughter cattle market is currently operating in an environment
where the amount of information available on product quality varies depending upon
the marketing method used. There are presently three main cash marketing methods.
available to producers in the US: (1) live weight; (2) dressed weight (in-the-beef);
and (3) dressed weight and grade (grade and yield). The information differential
generates uncertainty (risk). It follows that the degree of risk associated with each of
these marketing methods varies with the amount of information available on product
quality.
In a recent paper by Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner it was reported that producers'
profits differed between the live, in-the-beef, and grade and yield marketing methods
for slaughter cattle. They indicated that profits on average were highest with grade
and yield marketing and lowest with live wejght marketing. They also found that the
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variance in producer profits (risk) were greatest for grade and yield and smallest for
live ·weight marketing.
The objectives of this research are to determine: 1) what effect the risk
associated with incomplete information across marketing methods is having on the
market price for slaughter cattle; and 2) what effect product quality uncertainty is
having on buyer and seller behavior. The accomplishment of these objectives should
· provide additional insight into the U.S. slaughter cattle market and be particularly
valuable to those looking to modify the existing marketing methods or create new
value based marketing methods.
Theory
If the U.S. slaughter cattle market is efficient and there is full information
across all marketing methods, then one would expect the distribution of revenue
received by sellers should be equal across all marketing methods. However, the
structure of the market is such that there is not full information nor equal degrees of
incomplete information across the marketing methods. We contend that the
information structure of the slaughter cattle market accounts for some of the profit
differentials reported by Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner.
From the buyer's (meatpacker's) perspective, the grade and yield marketing
method is the full information method. The price paid to the seller is based on the
actual carcass weight and the USDA Quality and Yield Grades of that carcass. If
cattle are marketed in-the-beef, the carcass weight is known with certainty, but buyers
must estimate the expected quality and yield grades. There is a risk of incorrectly
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estimating the quality and yield grades and offering a price that is not in line with the
actual quality of the cattle. When cattle are marketed on a live weight basis, the
buyer must estimate the dressing percent (dressing percent = carcass weight/live
weight) and the quality and yield grades. There is not only the risk of incorrectly
estimating the quality of the cattle, but also of paying for more or less carcass weight
than actually exists. Ward provides a more detailed description of the three marketing
methods and the information available with each method.
Ward argued that.a buyer's risk increased going from grade and yield to in
the-beef to live weight pricing and that buyers offset that risk by offering a lower
price in the live and in-the-beef markets. Ward's argument is consistent with the
results derived in the factor market literature when quality uncertainty is the issue.
For a discussion of the literature see J.D. Hey. An empirical example of this
phenomenon is documented in the labor market literature, where a wage differential
exists among workers in a specific job classification. The differential is called
statistical discrimination and is attributed to different degrees of risk associated with
different population sub-groups (Baldwin; Aigner and Cain). We agree with Ward's
argument and shall provide evidence that buyers are essentially charging sellers a risk
premium in the live and dressed weight markets. Furthermore, it is hypothemed that
the live market has the greater risk premium.
While the risk to the buyer increases going from grade and yield to in-the-beef
to live weight marketing, caughlin correctly points out that the risk to the seller
.
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decreases. With live weight marketing, the seller knows with certainty at the time of
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sale the total revenue from any pen of cattle. However, with dressed weight or grade
and yield marketing, the price is known at the time of sale but the dressing percent or
carcass weight is not known for dressed weight marketing, and carcass weight, quality
and yield grades are not known for grade and yield marketing.
Thus, sellers' revenue per head under each marketing method is defined as :
(1)

E(GY Rew�) = E(GY Price=flJ}uality,Yield))•.l..iw Weight•E(Dressing Percent),
(3)
where E is the expectations operator; and GY is the grade and yield marketing
method. The risk to sellers is that the actual revenue from in-the-beef or grade and
yield marketing is not equal to the expected revenue because the carcass weight and/or
the quality and yield grades of the cattle were different then expected.
In analyzing the structure of the U.S. slaughter cattle market, Ward found that
in 1979, 98 percent of the cattle in the Southern Plains and 82 percent of the cattle in
the western com belt were marketed on a live weight basis. Dressed weight pricing
accounted for an additional one percent and 18 percent of the sales in the two regions,
respectively. Caughlin reported that in 1986 grade and yield sales accounted for about
half of the sales in the western com belt while grade and yield sales were still less
than

ten

percent of the sales in the Southern Plains.
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Since sellen choose the marketing method, and since there are cattle being
marketed under all three marketing methods, if risk premiums vary between market
marketing methods, then there must be a difference in the risk preferences of sellers.
This is consistent with Pratt's definition of absolute risk aversion, with respe.ct to the
relationship between the si7.e and sign of a risk premium and the agent's preference
toward risk:

<
for U11 - 0.
>

(4)

-If sellers had asymmetric information concerning cattle quality, there also
could be advantages to marketing the cattle under a particular method. This could
have the impact of creating a "lemons" market in the live weight market, the market
with the least amount of information. Akerlof provides a detailed description of the
effect uncertainty and asymmetric information have on markets. For this research, it
will be assumed that information is symmetric and that differences in marketing
method chosen can be attributable to differences in risk preference.
Data and Methodology

Detailed data were collected on 69 pens of steer calves in 1991 and 84 pens of
steer calves in 1992 as part of a retained ownership demonstration project (Wagner et
al. 1991 and 1992). These steers were marketed on a grade and yield basis in the
spring of the year when three out of the five steers were estimated to be at 0.4 inches
of fat over the 12th rib. The Choice market price and discounts for Select carcasses,
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Yield grade 4 carcasses ($10-12/cwt), carcasses over 950 pounds ($10/cwt), or
carcasses under 550 pounds ($12/cwt) were negotiated with a commercial cattle buyer
in a competitive market. The average live and dressed weight market prices for
similar types of steers were obtained from market quotes1 and revenue per head was
calculated as if the steers had been sold under all three marketing methods. Market
prices for the various marketing dates and marketing methods and average revenue
under each marketing method are shown in Table 1.
The data are most representative of the upper midwest/westem com belt region
of the U.S. The data also are limited to the March through June marketing time
frame. The results generated are thought to be representative of this marketing area
and time frame. However, additional research is needed to determine if similar
results would occur in other marketing areas and time frames.
Risk and Behavior

To test the assumption that buyers of cattle offset the risk associated with lack
of information on dressing percent and cattle quality by offering lowering prices in the
live and dressed weight markets, the following two testable hypotheses are set forth:
(1) there will be a significant risk premium charged to the seller in both the live
weight and dressed weight marketing methods; and (2) the risk premium will be
greater with live weight than dressed weight marketing. The expected value of the
risk premiums for live and dressed weight marketing methods are defined as follows:
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E GYREY, - I.REV,

(5)

LRP =-'·-1------

n

(6)

DRP

E GYREY, - DREY,

=-•·-•------

where LRP and DRP are the live weight and dressed weight risk premiums,
respectively; LREVh DREVb and GYREVi is the average revenue per head associated
with a pen of cattle marketed under the live weight, dressed weight, and grade and
yield marketing methods; and n is the number of pens of cattle marketed.
The live weight risk premium can be separated into the risk premium
associated with dressing percent uncertainty and the risk premium associated with
quality and yield grade uncertainty by subtracting :Equation 5 from :Equation 6, or by
calculating the dressed to live weight risk premium as follows:

E

DREY, - LREYi
=1-"1-----LDRP
n

(7)

The specific testable hypotheses are then:

Ho:

LRP = 0

Ho:

DRP

Ho:

LRP = DRP

=0
H1 : LRP > DRP.
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They will be tested using the Difference between Population Means: Matched Pair
test (Newbold).
From the theoretical discussion, it was hypothesized that risk to the buyer
decreased and the risk to the seller increased going from live to dressed to grade and
yield marketing. The risk is due to uncertainty of the dressing percent and of the
quality and yield grades. An approximation of this risk can be measured by
calculating the variance of the paired revenue differences used to calculate the risk
premiums in Equations S-7 as follows:

(8)

(9)

(t

11

Yar(LRP) =

GY.R£Yi-LREY,)

._
E<GYREY,-LREYj - _.__,._1 ____ _
,.1

n

n-1

•

E GYREY,-DREY,

•• _______
E
(GYREY,-DREYf - .......,_
n
,..
II

Yar(DRP)

2

= ------- - - -------1
n
11

EDREY,-LREY,

E (DREY,-LREYj - ......,_.1_____
II

(10)

Yar(LDRP)

2

n ___
= __
,._1 __________
n 1

The variance from Equations· is due to the variability in dressing percent,
quality grade and yield grade, compare Equations 1 and 3. The variance in Equation
9 is associated with the variability of quality and yield grades, compare Equations 2
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and 3, and F.quation 10 is.associated with the variability in dressing percent, compare
F.quations 1 and 2.
Pratt has shown that the insurance (risk) premium is equal to one-half the
variance of the risk times the absolute risk aversion coefficient:
(11)

RP = (Yar(Risl) •r)f}..

where r is the absolute risk aversion coefficient.
Rearranging F.quation 1 1, as follows:
(12)

r = 2RP/Yar(risk),

provides for the estimation of the absolute risk aversion coefficient. Using the risk
premiums calculated from Equations S-7 and the variance of the risk from Equations
8-10, the absolute risk aversion coefficient can be derived for buyers. Those
equations are as follows:
(13)

r16

=

(14)

r•

'"' 2DRP/Yar(DRP).

2LRP/Yar(LRP),

rw = 2LDRP/Yar(LDRP),

(15)

Results

Risk Premium Results
The average risk premiums were calculated using Equations S-7 and the above
mentioned data. The average risk premiums were then used to conduct hypothesis
9

tests to determine if the average risk premiums were statistically different from

7.Cl'O.

Evidence from the tests provide strong support for non-zero ri� premiums in all three
cases. The results are displayed in Table 2.
The tests found: 1) a statistically significant risk premium of $6.22 per head
being charged, on average, by buyers when purchasing cattle in the live weight
market instead of the grade and yield alternative; 2) the risk premium buyen charged
for purchasing in the dressed weight market instead of the grade and yield alternative
was $2.SS per head; and 3) the risk premium buyers charged for purchasing in the
live market instead of the dressed weight alternative was $3.67 per head. Based on
these risk premiums, it appears that buyen perceive a greater risk in estimating
dressing percent than in estimating quality and yield grades. For example, the
average dressed price during the study was $122.13 per cwt and estimating a 649'
dressing percent when actual dressing percent is 62 % would mean an overpayment of
$29.31 per head for a 1200 pound steer. And estimating a pen of steers to grade SO%
choice when only 409' actually graded choice would have been an overpayment of·
only $3. 84 per head, based on a 7SO pound carcass weight and the actual choice and
select prices observed during the study.
To summarize, the following statements are supported by the evidence
provided by the hypothesis tests: 1) buyers of cattle charge a risk premium in the live
and dressed weight markets; and 2) the risk premium increases as the risk increases.
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Calculated Risk Aversion Coefficients
The results of estimating the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficients using
· Equations 13-15 are presented in Table 2. All of the calculated risk aversion
coefficients are positive and equal, indicating that buyer risk averse behavior does not
·change across marketing methods. This is the result one would expect

to

find. Risk

aversion coefficients should not change as the level of risk .changes. Increased risk
should only the effect the risk premium charged.
Risk to Sellers
Revenue to sellers is know with certainty in the live market at the time the
cash market transaction takes place for an individ� pen of cattle, Equation 1.
However, our results show that on average sellers can expect a higher revenue in both
the dressed weight and grade and yield market. And yet, as both Ward and Caughlin
have noted, many sellers still use the live weight market. This behavior, on the part
of sellers, is a departure from the theory of individual profit maximiz.ation. However,
risk aversion and utility maximiz.ation rather than profit maximiz.ation can rationally
explain seller behavior.
If sellers are not risk neutral, then both the expected value of the return and
the degree of risk associated with that level of return are important considerations

to

the marketing decision. The mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation of
revenue for each marketing method are displayed in Table 1. The returns do increase
going from live to dressed to grade and yiel4 marketing, but the risk also increases.2
Not only do the standard deviations increase, but the level of risk proportional to the
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mean also increases, as measured by the coefficients of variation of 0.072, 0.082, and
0.084 for the live, dressed, and grade and yield marketing methods, respectively.
A number of empirical studies can be found in the agricultural literature on
estimated risk aversion coefficients. For example: 1) Raskin and Cochran; 2)Elam;
and 3) Holt and Brandt, have all estimated the risk aversion coefficients for producers
in the agricultural sector. Elam estimated risk aversion coefficients for leveraged
cattle feeders choosing to forward contract versus hedge their slaughter steers and
reported risk aversion CQCfficients of 0.02 to 0.04. Holt and Brandt estimated the risk
aversion coefficient for various hog hedging strategies and reported decision makers as
"risk averse" with risk aversion coefficients of 0.02 - 0.04 and those with risk
aversion coefficients of 0.03 - 0.10 were classified as "highly risk averse.
Raskin and Cochran raised the issue of classifying decision makers based on
the value of the Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficient and how the magnitude of the
underlying distribution can effect this classification. However, the magnitude of the
underlying distributions from this study is similar to the two studies by Elam and by
Holt and Brandt, allowing for some comparisons of the estimated risk aversion
coefficients. It would appear that cattle feeders are "risk averse" on average.
The implications of the above studies for our results are that risk aversion
levels vary among cattle producers and the risk preference of the seller is driving the
seller's marketing decision. Those sellers who have the least aversion to risk market
their cattle grade and yield. Those producers who have the greatest level of �sk
aversion market their cattle on a live weight basis. Given the estimated risk aversion
12

coefficients from the studies above and our estimate of the packer's risk aversion
coefficient; varying degrees of risk aversion provide a reasonable explanation for the
percentage break down of cattle marketed in each method reported by Caughlin and
Ward.

Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of the risk associated with lack of full
information over alternative slaughter cattle cash marketing methods. Of particular
interest, was buyer and seller behavior in the presence of that risk. Data from the
upper midwest/western cornbelt region of the U.S. were used to test the hypothesis
that buyers would charge a risk premium in the live and dressed weight marketing
methods. The risk to buyers purchasing under live, dressed, or grade and yield
pricing was approximated and the level of risk aversion of buyers was estimated.
Statistically significant risk premiums were found to be charged by packers
when buying slaughter steers on either a live or dressed weight basis compared to
buying on a grade and yield basis. The risk premium for live marketing averaged
$6.22 per head and the risk premium for dressed marketing was $2.55 per head.
There is more risk in correctly estimating the carcass characteristics on a live basis,
and this is reflected in the premium. The results substantiated our hypothesis that
cattle buyers would charge a risk premium in the live and dressed weight markets.
Specific Pratt-Arrow risk aversion coefficients were calculated for buyers
based on the ri.sk premiums charged and varian� of the risk for each marketing
method. These risk aversion coefficient were all equal at 0.02. The level of risk did
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not change the level of risk aversion, it only affected the magnitude of the risk
premium being charged. This result is consistent with the literature on uncertainty.
'The risk to sellers increases going from the live to dressed to grade and yield
marketing. Grade and yield marketing results in the highest expected revenue and live
weight marketing results in the lowest average revenue of the marketing methods. If
sellers were identical in their attitudes towards risk, then cattle would only be sold via
one of the marketing methods. However, since there are cattle sold under all three
marketing methods, we conclude that varying attitudes (risk aversion coefficients)
among producers explains the use of all three slaughter cattle marketing methods.
This paper provides strong empirical evidence that product quality uncertainty
affects the pricing and marketing decisions of participants in the slaughter cattle
market. We conclude that buyers do charge a risk premium in the live and dressed
markets; that buyers are risk averse; and, that varying levels of risk aversion among
sellers accounts for the use of all three slaughter cattle marketing methods.
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Footnotes
I.Hartman indicated the cattle from the project were representative of the cattle being
purchased in the .general market area. The -Nebraska Direct Dressed and Live weight
market prices were obtained from Data Transmission Network and the USDA, Livestock
and Wool Statistics, and were then adjusted down for the local basis by $1/cwt and
$0.64/cwt for dressed .and live weight, respectively.

2. The variation in revenue is based on variations in weight, dressing percent, quality
grade and yield grade of the cattle in our data set. Actual variations in market returns
would also include variations in prices offered. This is a limitation of our data set.
While not empirically tested in this paper, we hypothesize that the variations in market
returns would increase from live to dressed to grade and· yield marketing.
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Table 1.

Market Prices ($/cwt) for Various Marketing Dates and
Alternative Marketing Methods and Expected Revenue Under each
Marketing Method.

Grade & Yield
Live

Dressed

Choice

Select

April 10

80.96

127.00

130.00

125.00

May 2

79.57

125.50

129.00

122.00

May 8 & 9

78.81

124.00

128.00

120.00

June 20

73.59

1 15.00

1 19.00

1 1 1.00

March 31

77.97

124.00

125.00

123.00

April 14

78.40

123.00

126.00

124.00

April 23

76.44

120.00

122.00

119.00

May 19

75.97

118.50

125.00

1 19.00

Mean

873.24

876.91

879.46

Standard Deviation

62.94

71.59

74.08 .

Coefficient of Variation

0.072

Marketing Date

Year 1, 1991

Year 2, 1992

Revenue

0.082
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0.084

